

SSE 9

7 May 1948

TO : Subcommittee Members

FROM: Ralph Block, State, OII - Chairman, Subcommittee  
on Special Studies and Evaluations

H.

Reviewing the Committee's discussions it has become clear  
that the Committee's thinking has unavoidably been influenced by  
discussions in the NSC Committee.

1. As to what may develop in NSC thinking;
2. As to what may be required of this Committee in  
connection with NSC action.

This has tended to develop in the Subcommittee an interest in  
reconsideration of the total matter under study. I recognize  
that it is not possible to rule out of our thinking consideration  
of the JCS recommendation. Nevertheless certain facts have a  
bearing on it.

a. The discussions of the NSC Committee are under se-  
curity and this Subcommittee as a Committee has no off ci-  
cognizance of the discussions.

b. Until the National Security Council has come to a  
final decision which would have a bearing on the future  
of this Subcommittee of SANACC, the Subcommittee should con-  
tinue its studies in an orderly, organized manner.

With respect to the question of interpretation of SANACC pro-  
posals, the Subcommittee has always available to it recommendation of  
amendments for SANACC approval; if the Subcommittee can arrive  
at an agreement on amendment proposals. The Subcommittee will  
be failing in its responsibility if it did not always have in  
mind that its conclusions may be conditioned by new information  
or changed conditions.

It is obvious however that if the Subcommittee accepts the  
idea that the recommendations of the Subcommittee as constituted  
at one time, which recommendations have been approved by duly  
appointed representatives of the several Departments in SANACC,  
are as a matter of course and practice, always open to substanti-  
tive change by the Subcommittee as differently constituted in

REF ID: A6512

- 2 -

personnel, it would seem reasonable to expect that arrival at firm plans would be greatly delayed.

With regard to the foregoing, I believe that questions of definition or interpretation arising either in the NSC Subcommittee or the respective Departments for answer by this Subcommittee should be addressed by NSC to the SANACC Secretariat, either for direct reference to this Subcommittee or distribution preliminary to discussion in the Coordinating Committee.

A review of Subcommittee discussions points up the following, in which the term emergency measures is interpreted as minimum studies and conclusions now for implementation of p.w. in the event of war, within the Subcommittee frame of reference.

Regardless of the Subcommittee's conclusions on the operational functions of the proposed Organization or Agency, the Subcommittee cannot arrive at sound decisions unless it has an understanding of the technique of p.w. operations, which at the present stage it does not have, at least in any methodical presentation through the Subcommittee. Numbers and kinds of persons to be trained depends to a considerable extent on such understanding; the criteria of training depend wholly on it.

No sound recommendation can be made to the National Security Resources Board as to people and things without such understanding; nor can any firm assessment be made of resources within government agencies and departments.

Included in the problem of operations from this point of view, as well as bearing on the total subject of operational responsibility, is the question of the two divisions of black operations and the responsibility of the proposed Organization for domestic operations in war time.

The total question of NSIA's operational responsibility cannot be settled until the Committee has arrived at a firm point of view on domestic operations, having in mind all the old and new complexities of the problem.

I propose therefore that the Subcommittee reorganize its agenda in the following time order:

1. Determination of U.S. policy on p.w.; with development of theory and principles of p.w.
2. SO and MO and their relation to the proposed organization.

**SECRET**

- 3 -

3. Domestic operations.

4. An outline of specific operations and operational relations of a p.w. Organization in Continental U.S.; that is: Washington, New York and San Francisco; and their relation to field operations.

5. Training curricula.

6. Requirements of types and numbers of people and things.

a. With reference to their existence in agencies of the government.

b. To be obtained through the National Security Resources Board.

7. Field (theater) organization.

8. Research problems.

9. Legal problems.

10. Relation to civilian defense.

11. Relation to censorship.

cc: Colonel W. L. McNamee  
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